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This paper examines individual-level determinants of religious belief and practice 
through a comparative study of Catholics in Belgium, Ireland and Slovenia. Drawing on 
the World Values Survey, three interrelated questions are examined: (1) to what extent do 
Belgian Catholics differ from the Irish and Slovenian Catholics? (2) to what extent is this 
pattern the same across different social categories? and, (3) what factors help account for 
variation between Catholics in these three countries? Civic engagement predicts Mass 
attendance but operates differently in Ireland and Slovenia than in Belgium. Social trust 
is also predictive of Mass attendance. National pride helps to account for higher levels of 
belief in God among Irish Catholics. These findings suggest that Catholic identity is 
expressed in nationally-specific forms.  
 
































Within the sociology of religion literature, secularisation theory has achieved a totemic 
status and posits a strong association between large-scale social processes of 
modernisation (a bundle of „isations‟ including urbanisation, industrialisation, 
technologisation, capitalisation, bureaucratisation, and so forth) and the decline of 
religious-based forms of meaning. In this account, religious sources of meaning based on 
faith and superstition are displaced by rational secular sources of meaning provided 
through material advancement, science, and technology. Western Europe tends to be put 
forward as the poster child for this sacred to secular shift. At the same time, even within 
Western Europe the nature, timing and pace of secularisation appears variable – some 
societies like Ireland, for example – on the face of it seem to have experienced a 
somewhat milder, slower or delayed process of secularisation compared to others such as 
France. When one confines the study of secularisation to Catholic Europe, it is by no 
means clear that the timing and trajectory of secularisation is a unilinear universal 
process. Instead of seeing secularisation as a process that unfolds in a “typical” pattern it 
is more useful to consider it as a contingent varied process across time and space (Gorski 
and Altinordu 2008). In the present study I use the Roman Catholicism as a frame of 
reference for evaluating expected variation in secularising patterns in three similar though 
different parts of Catholic Europe – Belgium, Ireland and Slovenia – and I do this 
specifically with respect to secularisation at the individual-level.  
To be sure, sociological interest in the variable pathways of secularisation in 
different societies (Gorski and Altinordu 2008) is well established evidenced by attempts 
to construct typologies of secularisation „regimes‟ distinguishing, for example, in 
denominational terms between Catholic countries, Protestant countries, and mixed 
countries (Lambert 1996; Knippenberg 2005; Casanova 2006) but systematic 
comparisons between different parts of Catholic Europe, paying special attention to 
variation within the Catholic cluster – what I call the „varieties of Catholicism‟
1 – and 
involving periphery, continental, and eastern country cases are difficult to find.  
The paper is organised as follows. First, to provide some background to the study 
I briefly examine the socio-cultural contexts of each country. Following this I look at 
descriptive patterns in religious practice and belief in each. To provide a conceptual 
framework for the analysis I introduce and elaborate upon secularisation theory and, from 
the literature on determinants of religious behaviour, derive a number of hypotheses. To 
test these hypotheses I first carry out some bivariate analyses and then a multivariate 
analysis of micro-level factors that predict variation in religious belief and practice 
controlling for education, age, gender, income, marital status and education that previous 
research identifies as shaping religious identities (Cornwall 1989; Roth & Kroll 2007). I 
refer to these focal variables as the political ideology, civic engagement, national pride, 
social trust, and life satisfaction explanations of religiosity
1. This is proceeded in the next 
                                                 
1 Obviously, it may well be that these explanations of religious behaviour are also 
consequences of it though I do not empirically test this reverse causality in the present 
study. In the absence of longitudinal data we are not well positioned to address this causal 
order problem.      4 
section by an account of salient similarities and differences between the three country 
cases.   
 
Comparing the Three Catholic Countries 
Comparative research on religion has usefully categorised wider Europe in 
denominational terms by distinguishing between Catholic, Protestant, and mixed 
countries. Within the Catholic cluster Belgium, Ireland and Slovenia were chosen as 
comparison countries based on expected variation on the two dependent variables - Mass 
attendance and belief in God. The three cases represent a fascinating 'similar-case 
comparison‟ (Spillman 1997: 12) and particularly with respect to my conceptual focus 
here, Catholic identity. This section of the paper is not intended to provide a detailed 
analysis of each case but rather to draw out the major characteristics of each in terms of 
their religious landscape.  
Table 1 summarises the major sources of variation between the cases. Clearly, the 
three societies under consideration are characterised by important socio-cultural 
differences and similarities and this socio-cultural background provides an important 
context to understanding micro-level religious identities. By comparing these three 
specific countries, however, variability on some dimensions – political history, nature of 
secularisation, Catholic history  for example – can be maximised while on other variables 
– such as Catholic population size, geographical size, and levels of economic 
modernization – variation can be minimised. 
Belgium, Ireland and Slovenia are all small European societies and economies – 
Ireland is located at the periphery, Belgium at the core, and Slovenia at the eastern 
border. Importantly they are all countries with historically Catholic majorities and with a 
small proportion of their respective populations comprised by non-Catholics. In the 1990 
wave of the World Values Survey, 96.65% of the Belgian sample, 96.87% of the Irish 
sample, and 94.20% of the Slovenian sample self-identified as Catholics. Despite these 
basic commonalities, these three societies are also characterised by striking differences in 
terms of their macro political traditions and histories of church-state relations.  
Belgian, like Ireland, is an example of a stable democracy and its independence 
goes back to 1830 (Madeley 2003). Against the monopoly and suppression models 
represented by Ireland and Slovenia respectively – Belgium is an example of a „Catholic 
pillar‟ model (Dobbelaere 1995: 5). By pillarization is meant the organisation of societal 
institutions (schools, hospitals, political parties, media etc.) based on (secular and 
religious) ideological interests. One consequence of this pillarisation is that Catholic 
social organisation has tended to be stronger in Belgium than the other two cases (Ertman 
2000). It manifests, for example, in a Catholic political party in the national parliament 
though with declining support now
2 (Dobbelaere and Voyé, 1990) as compared to Ireland 
where the Catholic credentials of political parties are much more implicit. At the same 
time, Belgian Catholicism – like Irish Catholicism – was a conduit for the expression of 
national identity in the face of its powerful neighbour with a rival religious tradition – 
                                                 
 
2 Recently the Belgian Catholic Party disavowed its religious roots by 
rechristening itself as a humanist democratic party (personal communication, Vincent 
Hildebrand, May 2009). 
   5 
Calvinist Holland (Madeley 2003). Unlike Ireland though, Belgium has a strong 
Protestant minority.  
From the 1960s, Belgian society – closely resembling the Irish experience – has 
moved in a more secular liberal direction though Mass attendance rates peaked at around 
50 per cent of the Catholic population compared to over 90 per cent in the Irish case 
(Dobbelaere 1990). Generational experiences seem to exert a strong influence in Belgium 
(and Ireland) on religious belonging – the drop off in Mass attendance is more 
pronounced among young people than older generations. As in the Irish case, Belgium‟s 
Catholic Church has experienced a significant reduction in recruitment. Ordinations 
declined from 38 in 1978 to 12 in 2004.  The peak year of vocations in Belgium – 1949 –
was earlier than in Ireland and the decline was underway well before Vatican II (Fishman 
and Jones 2007). The Belgian hierarchy – and the hierarchy of then communist controlled 
countries of Eastern Europe – has tended to be more positively oriented to changes 
brought about by Vatican II than the Irish hierarchy (Wilde 2007).  
The Belgian case is complicated by the fact of its regional division between a 
predominately Dutch or Flemish-speaking Flanders region in the north and a 
predominately French-speaking Walloon region in the south. This linguistic and regional 
nationalism cleavage is overlaid with other social divisions including religion and social 
class. The Flanders region is made up of a higher proportion of Roman Catholics than the 
Walloon region. To take account of this regional diversity, for the Belgian sample I 
distinguish between people who come from the Flanders region and people who come 
from the Walloon region. 72% of the Belgian Catholic sample comprises Flemish people 
and Walloons constitute the remaining 28%. Based on previous research (Dobbelaere & 
Voyé 1990), Flemish Catholics should be more likely to attend Mass and believe in God 
than Walloon Catholics.  
Turning to the Irish case, a strong historical linkage developed between national 
and religious identity owing to a long history of religious persecution under English 
colonialization (Dillon 1996; Peillon 1982; Stark 1992). During this time, announcing 
one‟s Catholic identity became an important conduit through which opposition to British 
suppression was expressed. The „golden age‟ of Irish Catholicism spanned the post-
Famine period (1840s) up to the 1960s during which the Catholic Church emerged as a 
„Catholic monopoly‟ model exerting a strong influence on state activity and on how 
ordinary people lived out their lives especially in the domain of sexual morality (Fahey 
1999; Hornsby-Smith, 1992). The church‟s dominant position was solidified when 
Ireland became independent in 1921 – an example of „democratic continuity‟ (Fishman 
and Jones 2007: 145) – and its interests were closely aligned with those of national 
political elites. Organisationally, the Catholic monopoly model was reflected in a 
vigorous church building programme since the mid-1800s and a steady stream of priestly 
vocations servicing the national church at home and a „spiritual empire‟ abroad 
(Hornsby-Smith 1992; Inglis 1987; Peillon 1982). Thus, the Irish Catholics church has 
tended to be strongly allied with the state - in contrast to Catholicism in Slovenia - but 
also to have a relatively strong grassroots infrastructure up until the 1960s via 
associational entities like confraternities and sodalities and other devotional 
organisations. Vocations to the priesthood have been declining significantly since the late 
1950s though – the peak year was 1959 (Fishman and Jones 2007: 141) – and are now 
well below replacement level. Since the 1970s the decline has been even more dramatic   6 
and fell from 77 in 1978 to 13 in 2004. Owing to this weakened organisational strength 
and to internal church scandals in recent years, institutional Irish Catholicism seems less 
dominant than before.  By contrast with Slovenian Catholicism or Belgian Catholicism, 
Irish Catholicism has tended to be more international in orientation and historically this 
was reflected in the training of priests in Irish colleges in continental Europe and in 
missionary activity in Africa (Inglis 1987). 
Slovenia represents a case of a Catholic country in eastern Europe with a 
developed economy
3. It  has a long history as a Catholic country going back to its early 
Christianisation in the sixth century (Črnič and Lesjak 2003) and shares with Ireland 
(during its much earlier Penal law era) a historical experience of systematic Catholic 
Church suppression – under communism – during which a strong linkage was forged 
between religious identity and national identity. During this communist era (spanning the 
1950s to the late 1980s), the Catholic Church, and in common with other Eastern 
European countries with a communist regime (Greeley 2003; Zrinscak 2004; Froese 
2004; Črnič and Lesjak 2003), experienced strong state opposition via an attempt to drain 
its influence from Slovenia public and civic life (Gautier 1997; Rakar, 2005; Flere, 1999; 
Ivan, 2002; Stres 2000). This suppression – though somewhat milder than that 
experienced in other communist societies (Črnič and Lesjak 2003) – took different forms 
and included state appropriation of the church‟s property assets, restrictions on religious 
education, and the breaking of diplomatic relations with the Holy See (Zrinščak 2004). 
Internal decisions within the Slovenian Catholic Church particularly its policy of giving 
symbolic support to Nazi Germany worked against its public standing after World War II 
even further (Pollack 2001, 2003).  
However, this official and systematic state suppression did not succeed in purging 
the social influence of the Catholic Church (Rakar 2005; Ivan, 2002; Lužny and 
Navrátilová 2001; Froese 2004) and demonstrated the Catholic Church‟s tenacity in a 
hostile national context (Froese 2004). The collapse of communism in 1989/1990 ended 
state suppression of the church resulting in an abrupt and sudden transition from religious 
persecution to religious freedom. This freedom to practice religion was underwritten by 
the 1991 constitution and helped to bring about improved legal and material conditions 
and diplomatic relations for the Slovenian Catholic Church (Črnič and Lesjak 2003). 
Because of this experience of recent abrupt and radical social change from one political 
system to another (Kohn et al 1997), Slovenia differs from the Belgian and Irish cases.  
Two important consequences of this bear upon this analysis. First, one might expect 
Catholicism to have experienced a „bounce‟ or revival to some "natural" or "normal" 
level of belief and practice (Meulemann 2004) following the end of communism and its 
long-term suppression of religious belief and practice though how long this might last 
and whether it would only delay a longer term secularising trend is an open question. 
Second, because of its communist history, like other former communist societies, 
Slovenia tends to have a poorly developed civil society infrastructure (Howard 2003).   
                                                 
 
3 For more detail on the post-1989 Slovenian economy and particularly its foreign 
direct investment (FDI) efforts see Bandelj 2009. Despite being one of the wealthiest 
post-communist countries, Slovenia has a comparatively – and surprisingly – low level of 
FDI (Bandelj 2009).  
   7 
This discussion completes our analysis of the major dimensions along which the 




Table 1: Comparing the Three Catholic Countries 
 
Variable    Belgium    Ireland     Slovenia 
 
 
Catholic Model  Pillar      Monopoly    Suppression 
 




Church-State    Co-operation    Co-operation    Antagonism 
Nexus 
 
Macro Political  Continuous    Continuous    Regime  
History






The centre of gravity in the sociology of religion is provided by secularisation 
theory. Indeed, the „secularisation debate‟ (Swatos & Olson 2000; Gorski 2003) 
constitutes this sub-field of the discipline and much research turns on it. The basic 
premise of this theory is that there is a kind of see-saw relationship between 
modernisation and secularisation, that is, as societies become more modernised people 
tend to give up their religious identities and religious institutions and discourses tend to 
lose their influence (Need and Evans, 2001). José Casanova neatly puts forward three 
meanings of the concept – differentiation, by which is meant that as societies become 
more modernised various social institutions become more and more differentiated from 
one another (Casanova 1994; Ebaugh, Lorence and Chafetz 1996), the decline of 
individual-level belief and practice, and privatisation by which is meant that religion 
tends to become exiled to the private sphere as its public role is vanquished.  Casanova 
feels that stronger empirical support exists for the first two meanings than the third 
(Casanova 1994)  
Anxieties about transposing this theory beyond its time and place of origin – 
Western Europe in the 1950s – and the accumulation of empirical evidence falsifying it, 
has prompted the putting forward of a competitor-theory under the title of rational choice 
theory. Proponents of this argue that secularisation theory does not have much analytical 
                                                 
 
4 This differentiation comes from Meulemann (2004).  
 
5 This differentiation comes from Fishman and Jones (2007).   8 
purchase in terms of explaining religiosity in America, a hyper-modernised society 
characterised by religious vitality in the context of a spiritual marketplace and little or no 
state regulation. These two factors – the presence or absence of state regulation and the 
degree of pluralism of the religious field – in this account help to explain the strength of 
religion in America and its apparent weakness in much of Western Europe (Verweij, 
Ester and Nauta, 1997). Against the bold „God is dead‟ claim of some secularisation 
theorists (Bruce 2002), followers of this perspective remind us of the plurality of 
religious claims in the modern world (Berger, Davie and Fokas, 2008).  
The substantive predictions, then, of secularisation theory are clear enough but it 
is far from clear that the timing or pace of the changes it predicts is universal or that the 
changes it predicts at a societal level occur at the same pace as changes at the individual 
and institutional levels. From prior research, there is good reason to think that 
secularisation at an individual-level or „subjective secularisation‟ (Berger 1967) – the 
focus of this paper – has a variable pathway. Students of religion have spent considerable 
time „grounding‟ secularisation theory by studying the antecedents of individuals‟ 
religious attitudes and behaviour and from this literature we know that such things as 
civic engagement (Casanova 1994; Lichterman 2008; Uslaner 2002), efficacy (Cornwall, 
1989; Sherkat & Ellison 1999), life satisfaction (Sherkat & Ellison 1999; Clark & Lelkes 
2005), social trust (Delhey & Newton 2005), and national pride and identity (Zubrzycki 
2006; Smith & Kim 2006) all have important and complex influences on people‟s 





The sociological literature and the historical background of each country 
motivates a number of hypotheses which are tested in this present study controlling for 
the usual demographic background variables. These hypotheses are referred to as the 
social trust, national pride, efficacy, life satisfaction, civic engagement and political 
ideology hypotheses. Against the background of the different socio-political and 
institutional histories between the three countries described earlier one would predict 
variation between Belgian, Irish and Slovenian Catholics in terms of the expected 
influence of the explanatory variables on religious practice and belief.  
 
Hypothesis 1 – Social Trust 
 
Given the assumption that people with high levels of social trust are more likely to attend 
religious services and believe in God and given the long history of communism in 
Slovenia and its suppression of civil society activity and that trust is others can be created 
through social organisation, one would expect that Irish and Belgian Catholics would be 
more likely to attend religious services and have higher levels of religious belief than 
Slovenian Catholics. 
 
Hypothesis 2 – National Pride 
   9 
Given the assumption that people with high levels of national pride are more likely to 
attend religious services and have high levels of belief and given the historically strong 
connection between national identity and religion in Ireland, Irish Catholics should be 
more likely to attend religious services and have higher levels of religious belief than 
either Belgian or Slovenian Catholics. 
 
Hypotheses 3 – Efficacy 
 
Given the assumption that people who feel that their actions exert an influence over what 
happens to them are more likely to think that their actions in „this-world‟ will influence 
their fate in the „other-world‟ and given the weak civil society in Slovenia under 
communism, one would expect that Belgian and Irish Catholics would have higher levels 
of efficacy, attend religious services more often and have high levels of religious belief 
than Slovenian Catholics. 
 
Hypothesis 4 – Life Satisfaction 
 
Given the assumption that people who have high levels of satisfaction with „this-world‟ 
would be less likely to be concerned about their salvation in the „other-world‟ and given 
the suppressive nature of Slovenian society under communism, one would lower levels of 
life satisfaction among Slovenian Catholics and therefore that they would have higher 
levels of religious practice and belief than Belgian or Irish Catholics. 
 
Hypothesis 5 – Civic Engagement 
 
Given the assumption that people who are already engaged in secular kinds of civic 
organisations and have a general propensity to become involved in local associations and 
given the weak organisation of civil society in former communist countries such as 
Slovenia, one would expect that Slovenian Catholics would be less likely to also attend 
religious services and to have lower levels of religious belief than Belgian or Irish 
Catholics 
 
Hypothesis 6 – Political Ideology 
 
Given the assumption that people who are oriented towards the left wing of the political 
spectrum tend to be less likely to attend religious services and to have lower levels of 
belief and the historical importance of communism in Slovenia, one would expect 
Slovenian Catholics would be less likely to also attend religious services and to have high 
levels of religious belief than Belgian or Irish Catholics. 
 
 
Data, Variables and Measures 
 
Sample 
The individual-level data for this analysis come from the World Values Survey 
(WVS). The WVS is a large-scale, multi-wave, global survey fielded in eighty societies   10 
and spanning six continents. Because different respondents or samples are asked the same 
questions at different points in time it constitutes a repeated cross-sectional survey 
(Firebaugh 1997). It involves the collection of nationally representative samples in each 
society and attitudinal data on a wide range of items including family, religion, civic 
engagement, employment, national identity, political life, environment, social trust, and 
immigration via a face-to-face interview of respondents over 18 years of age. The sample 
design involved both random and quota sampling and the fielding of the survey was 
organised by a social research institute or university in each national context (the 
Catholic University of Leuven (Belgium), the Economic and Social Research Institute 
(Ireland), and the Centre for Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research, 
University of Ljubljana (Slovenia)
6. The WVS is particularly well suited to examining 
determinants of religious belief and practice because it comprises rich data about a wide 
range of individual-level attitudes and values and the repeated nature of it across different 
societies allows one to assess this at different points in time and in comparative 
perspective.  
To date, four waves (1981, 1990, 1992 and 1999) of the WVS have been carried 
out though the participating countries were not uniform across all four waves. In this 
paper I employ questions from the “religious and morale” module. This module contains 
a set of attitudinal questions as well as questions about religious practice and the role of 
religious institutions. Within this I selected only respondents who self-identified as 
Roman Catholic when asked what religious denomination they belonged to. I dropped all 
other religious denominations from the sample. Slovenia was not included in the WVS 
until 1992. For only one year – 1999 – data for all three countries are available. In order 
to examine change over time one needs data for at least two different points in time 
(Firebaugh 1997). I chose 1990 and 1999 – separated by a lengthy period of nine years – 
as the sample years for comparing the three cases. Because of data constraints, I use the 
1992 wave for Slovenia as the baseline year for this case and 1990 for the other two. The 
Catholic sample sizes were variable: 2,926 in Belgium, 1,828 in Ireland and 1,379 in 
Slovenia. My total sample is made up of 6,133 with a mean of 2,044 for each country. 
Table 2 summarises all the variables and their definitions used in the analysis.  
 
Control Variables 
  In this study I investigate the influence of six sets of factors on religious practice 
and belief controlling for demographic/background factors: social trust, national pride, 
efficacy, life satisfaction, civic engagement, and political ideology. The demographic 
background variables or measures of “biographical availability” (Viterna 2006) are age, 
gender, income, marital status, number of children, and education. Age is a continuous 
variable measured in years. To make descriptive country comparisons more interpretable 
we recoded age as a categorical variable (solely for this part of the analysis) 
distinguishing between the following age categories: (1) less than 18 years of age (2) 18-
35 years (3) 36-50 years (4) 51-64 years and, (5) people aged 65 and over. The sex of 
                                                 
 
6 In each society a single national survey was carried out in each wave 
irrespective of regional diversity as manifested, for example, in Belgium‟s Flanders and 
Wallonia regions though the inclusion of a region variable in the study allows us to 
distinguish between different regions within each country sample.   11 
respondents is a binary variable and men are scored as 1. The marital status variable 
originally consisted of five response categories – married, cohabiting, separated, 
divorced, widowed. I recoded this variable into a binary variable with living together and 
not married as the response categories.  Married and cohabiting were collapsed into the 
living together category and the remaining categories were collapsed into a non-married 
category.  
  The income variable comes from a question that asked respondents about their 
income range.  Income for each country was expressed in national currencies (franc for 
Belgium, punt for Ireland, and tolars for Slovenia). Some variation between the countries 
in the income variable response categories is noteworthy. Respondents from Belgium and 
Ireland were asked to express their income in terms of a yearly range, and Slovenian 
respondents were asked to express their income in terms of 1-9 steps ranging from first 
step to ninth step or in terms of a monthly range. Each of the country income variables 
was recoded. For both the Belgian and Irish income variables I substituted the income 
range with the mid-point of each range. Missing values were substituted by the mean 
income for each country. I recoded the Slovenian income variable in three steps. First I 
substituted each income range with the mid-point. Second, I multiplied the monthly 
income by twelve in order to express this in terms of yearly income and establish a 
common temporal metric for each country. For respondents who gave one of the steps as 
their income (as an alternative to selecting an income range) I substituted this with the 
equivalent monthly income range multiplied by twelve – the first step corresponded to 
the first income range and so on. Third, mean substitution was used to deal with missing 
values.   
I also control for the presence of children which is measured as the number of 
children the respondent has. An education variable was constructed from a question that 
asked respondents about their years of education.  
 
Explanatory Variables 
A question asking respondents about whether most people could be trusted or 
whether one needs to be very careful in dealing with people was used as a proxy for 
social trust. This is a binary variable with 1 indicating „most people can be trusted‟ and 0 
that one „can‟t be too careful‟. 
From a question that asked respondents about how proud they were of their 
nationality, a measure of national pride was derived. Responses to this question were 
very proud, quite proud, not very proud and not at all proud. I reverse coded this variable 
so that low levels on it represented a low level of national pride and high levels a high 
level of national pride.  
The study‟s efficacy measure comes from a question that asked respondents how 
much freedom and control they felt they had in their lives. The responses to this question 
took the form of a scale ranging from 1-10 with 1 indicating „none at all‟ and 10 
indicating „a great deal‟ and respondents were asked to place themselves on this scale.  
A measure of life satisfaction was derived from a question that asked respondents 
„all things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?‟ 
Respondents were invited to respond to this question on a scale ranging from 0-10 with 0 
indicating „dissatisfied‟ and 10 indicating „satisfied‟.   12 
  From a question that asked respondents about whether they belonged to a civic 
organisation I constructed a measure of civic engagement. Respondents were presented 
with a listing of voluntary organisations and were asked to indicate whether they 
belonged to any or not.  
A political ideology variable was constructed from a question in which 
respondents were asked to position themselves on a left-right political scale with 1 
indicating „left‟ and 10 indicating „right‟.    
 
Dependent Variables 
This study consists of two dependent variables. First, I use religious service 
attendance as a measure of religious practice. This ordinal variable comes from a 
question that asked respondents „apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about 
how often do you attend religious services these days?.‟ The response categories to this 
question were: (1) more than once a week, (2) once a week, (3) once a month, (4) only on 
special holy days/Christmas/Easter days, (5) other specific holy days, (6) once a year, (7) 
less often, (8) never practically never. I reverse coded the Mass attendance variable from 
the original 1-8 scale to a 0-7 scale so that low values on it represented low levels of 
attendance thus making interpretation of mean differences across countries more 
intuitive
7.  
  Second, I use belief in God as the religious belief dependent variable. The belief 
in God variable is part of a battery of belief questions asking about belief in life after 
death, hell, heaven, sin, and reincarnation. Belief in God is coded as a binary variable 
with 1 representing belief and 0 non-belief.  
The statistical analysis proceeds in two steps. First, I present descriptive statistics 
(Tables 3-5) and bivariate correlations (Tables 6-11) for the data. Second, I carry out a 
multivariate analysis to estimate the determinative effect of the explanatory variables. 
The multivariate analysis is conducted in a number of steps. I estimate ordered probit 
models
8 for each country separately for the Mass attendance dependent variable (Tables 
12-13). Because the religious belief dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, I 
estimate a binary logistic regression model (Tables 14-15) for this variable.  I do this for 
two different points in time for each country – 1990 (1992 for Slovenia) and 1999. All 
the descriptive and inferential statistical analyses were carried out using the statistical 
software package STATA.  
   
 
                                                 
7 Previous research leads one to be cautious about the validity of data about 
church attendance (Hadaway, Marler and Chaves 1993) but in the absence of alternative 
data sources such as Catholic Church head-counts to cross-check self-reported Mass 
attendance, we must rely on the latter. Based on American data for select dioceses, 
Hadaway, Marler and Chaves (1993) found that Mass attendance among Catholics may 
be overestimated by half. For more on church counts of attendance see Iannaccone and 
Everton (2004). See Ammerman (2007) for discussion of the limits of survey data in 
understanding the full range of religious experience and Smith (1998) for a strong 
defence of the social survey approach.  
8 For a synthetic overview of the ordered probit model see Daykin and Moffatt 
(2002).    13 
 
Descriptive Patterns of Religious Practice and Belief 
This section of the paper presents basic descriptive data for the country samples 
with respect to Mass attendance and belief in God
9. This preliminary analysis helps in 
providing some initial evidence to test our hypotheses and provides tentative answers to 
some important questions guiding this paper: how do Irish, Belgian, and Slovenian 
Catholics vary in terms of belief and practice? To what extent do beliefs and practice 
hang together or converge? Is secularisation taking hold more among some social 
categories – defined by age, gender, education, income and so forth – than others? To 
help address these questions I present the descriptive data in graphical format (see 
Figures 1-17).  
Sociologist Grace Davie‟s influential concept of „believing without belonging‟ 
which she has applied to contemporary British society (Davie 2007a) – but which also 
has some purchase in Scandanavian societies (Halman & Draulans 2004) – reminds us 
there is no simple relationship between belief and practice (Davie 2007b). People may 
practice their religion without believing or people may believe but not act on those 
beliefs. And people‟s lack of beliefs may have different sources – sheer lack of 
knowledge, disenchantment with authority, or simply disinterest (Yamane, 2007) – and 
belonging can be considered in ways other than the standard emphasis on attending 
religious services such as alms-giving and helping the needy. When we consider the 
„Catholic countries‟ of Belgium, Ireland and Slovenia, what can we say about the 
relationship between belief and belonging? Are people who are „high‟ on belief „high‟ on 
practice as well? Stated differently, are Mass goers in these three societies more likely to 
believe in God than those who do not attend Mass? Or are those who do not believe in 
God more likely to go to Mass than those who do?  
Tables 3-5 present the descriptive statistics for each country. As these tables make 
clear, the Belgian sample is somewhat older than the Irish and Slovenian samples with a 
mean age of 47 and 51 years in the 1990 and 1999 sample years. In all three countries, 
females represent a higher proportion of the sample than males and being married is the 
predominant marital status. In line with expectations, Irish Catholics have more children 
than either Belgian or Slovenian Catholics with a mean number of children of 2.60 in the 
sample year 1999 compared to 1.94 for Belgian Catholics and 1.64 for Slovenian 
Catholics.   Tables 3-5 also report the mean for each of the explanatory predictor 
variables in the analysis. Overall, the distributions of the sample countries are broadly 
similar in terms of age, gender, marital status, number of children, and years of 
education.  
  The three samples differ on the dependent variables. Irish Catholics tend to have 
significantly higher levels attendance at Mass than Belgian and Slovenian Catholics. In 
1999, 45.6% of Irish respondents reported that they attended Mass once a week and while 
a much smaller proportion, 15 per cent, of Slovenians did so. Significantly, a higher 
proportion of Slovenian Catholics, 11 per cent in 1999, who never attend religious 
services compared to Irish Catholics. Figures 1-3 make clear that there has been a clear 
decline in Mass attendance over time in Belgium and Ireland but not in Slovenia. When 
                                                 
 
9 With respect to religious beliefs one can make a distinction between doctrinal 
beliefs – beliefs about such things as God, heaven, and hell – and socio-political beliefs 
or beliefs having to do with the role of religion in the public square (Yamane, 2007).   14 
age is considered in terms of Mass attendance older cohorts born before Vatican II in 
both Belgium and Ireland are more religious than younger cohorts born after Vatican II 
but this is not true of Slovenia. Whether the apparently lower level of religious activity 
and belief among younger Irish and Belgian Catholics is due to age, cohort or period 
effects is difficult to gauge. It is likely that all three are operative. Longitudinal rather 
than the cross-sectional data used here is better suited to understanding their relative 
importance
10. Across all age categories (see Figure 4), Irish Catholics tend to go to Mass 
more often than Belgian and Slovenian Catholics. 
With respect to religious beliefs, Irish Catholics are also more likely to believe in 
God than Belgian or Slovenian Catholics. Almost all Irish Catholics (98.5%) reported 
that they believed in God in 1999 compared to 84.82% of Slovenian Catholics. The 
proportion of Belgian Catholics who believe in God – 91.4%  – is lower than the 
proportion of Irish Catholics who do so but higher than the proportion of Slovenians. 
When belief in God is examined in terms of age, Irish Catholics across all age categories 
tend to have higher levels of belief in God than Belgian or Slovenian Catholics. Cohort 
differences in belief in God also exist (see Figures 5-7) with respect to belief in God but 
the difference between pre-Vatican II cohorts and post-Vatican II cohorts are slight. In all 
three countries younger Catholics are less likely to believe in God.   
In relation to other belief items (see Figure 8), Irish Catholics also report higher 
levels of belief than Belgian or Slovenian Catholics. Consider, for example, that just over 
half of Irish Catholics believe in the existence of Hell (a decrease of less than one per 
cent on nine years previously) while 27.8% of Slovenia Catholics do so, an increase of 
slightly more than five per cent as compared to 1992, and just under 22% of Belgian 
Catholics believe in Hell. Irish Catholics are also more likely (results not shown) to 
believe in such things as life after death and heaven than either Belgian or Slovenian 
Catholics. 
Being a "good" Catholic is not restricted to believing in these items. It also means 
following church teachings (see Figure 9). Irish Catholics are also more likely to follow 
church teaching and obey church authority on socio-moral issues such as abortion and 
sex outside marriage  than Belgian or Slovenian Catholics. Slightly more than half 
(53.6%) of Irish Catholics in 1999 felt that abortion is never justifiable while 22.3% of 
Slovenian Catholics and 35.6% of Belgian Catholics did so. Irish Catholics are less 
approving of divorce - almost 27% (1999 data) regard it as “never justifiable”, compared 
to 15.8% of Slovenian Catholics and 16.3% of Belgian Catholics. In terms of sexual 
morality, Irish Catholics adopt a more legalistic attitude than Slovenian Catholics. In 
1999, 57.5% of Irish Catholics believed that casual sex was “never justifiable” compared 
to 42.9% of Slovenian Catholics. Looking at changes over time in attitudes towards 
socio-moral issues, there is a trend towards more „liberal‟ opinion across all three cases 
with the exception of attitudes towards abortion among the Slovenian sample.   
With respect to other religious behaviours such as prayer (see Figure 10), Irish 
Catholics report higher levels of prayer outside of religious services than Slovenian 
Catholics and Belgian Catholics. 51% of Irish Catholics “often” pray to God (1990 data) 
while 16.2% of Slovenian Catholics do so (1992 data) and 13.5% of Belgian Catholics 
often pray.  
                                                 
10 For more on disentangling these effects see Crockett and Voas (2006).   15 
On church-state relations, Slovenian Catholics are more likely than Irish Catholics 
to disapprove of church involvement in political affairs. In the 1999 WVS, 27.9% of 
Slovenian Catholics “strongly agree” that religious leaders should not influence 
government while the corresponding figure for Irish Catholics was 20%. This finding is 
supported by patterns in relation to confidence in churches. Slovenian Catholics tend to 
have a good deal less confidence in the Catholic Church than Irish or Belgian Catholics. 
Slovenian Catholics are more likely to express disapproval of Catholic Church 
involvement in the political sphere than Irish Catholics – but not Belgian Catholics – and 
this may owe something to the Slovenian church‟s strong anti-communist position in the 
past. It may well be that people differentiate between church intervention in politics and 
church intervention relating to the socio-moral/religious sphere and are more approving 
of the latter than the former (Zubrzycki, 2006: 198).  
Turning to the question of the relationship between „believing‟ and „belonging‟, to 
what extent is being churched associated with belief? Figure 11 presents the differences 
across the three societies in Mass attendance by belief in God. From this table it is clear 
that the relationship between believing and belonging is not simple or straightforward and 
that „belonging without believing‟ – the reverse of Davie‟s concept – is higher among 
Irish Catholics than Belgian or Slovenian Catholics.  
  Tables 6-11 present the correlation matrices for the three sample countries and for 
each of the dependent variables. In the Belgian sample (1990 wave), Mass attendance is 
positively correlated with age, income, living together, number of children, social trust, 
national pride, and life satisfaction and negatively correlated with gender,  years of 
education, efficacy, civic engagement, and political ideology. The correlation is low in 
size for each of these positively correlated variables (r = .25 for age; r =  .006 for income, 
r = .01 for living together, r = .14 for number of children, r = .14 for social trust, r = .03 
for national pride and r = .04 for life satisfaction).  For the negatively correlated variables 
the r values are also low in size (r = -.009 for gender; r = -.01 for years of education; r = -
.03 for efficacy; r = -.14 for civic engagement; r = -.06 for political ideology). 
  For the Irish sample, there are statistically significant correlations between Mass 
attendance and age, income, gender, living together, number of children, years of 
education, and social trust. The correlation between Mass attendance and age, living 
together, number of children, and social trust is positive but small in size (r = .20 for age; 
r = .06 for living together; r = .11 for number of children; and r = .14 for social trust). 
Mass attendance is negatively correlated with income (r = .11), gender (r = -.11), years of 
education (r = -.07), civic engagement (r = -.004) and political ideology (r = -.01).  
  Table 8 presents the correlation matrix for the Slovenian sample. As this table 
makes clear, there is a statistically significant positive correlation between Mass 
attendance and  number of children though the correlation is low in size (r = .09). There 
is a negative correlation between Mass attendance and years of education (r = -.08) and 
income (r = -.07) but both correlations are low.   
  Turning to the correlation matrices for belief in God for each country separately, 
there is a positive correlation in the Belgian sample between belief in God and age (r = 
.13), living together (r = .06), not married (r = .06) and number of children (r = .08) and 
the correlations are small in size. There is a negative but small correlation between belief 
in God and gender (r = -.10) and years of education (r = -.07).  In the Irish sample there is 
a small positive correlation between belief in God and age (r = .07) and national pride (r   16 
= .08). A small positive correlation exists between belief in God and number of children 
(r = .10) in the Slovenian sample. There is a negative correlation between gender (r = -
.10), income (r = -.16), years of education (r = -.19), social trust (r = -.02) and belief in 
God among Slovenian Catholics but the correlation is small in size.  
  With respect to the explanatory variables, levels of social trust are highest in 
Ireland and lowest in Slovenia. National pride is highest in Ireland and lowest in 
Belgium. Over time there was an increase in levels of efficacy across the three countries 
and the largest increase - in line with expectations - was in Slovenia. Life satisfaction is 
high in all three countries and increased between the two waves in Ireland and Slovenia 
but decreased in Belgium. Civic engagement also decreased over time in the three 
countries and the largest decline in civic activism occurred in Slovenia. Between 1990-
99, civic engagement in Belgium decline by .7, in Ireland by .9, and in Slovenia by .17. A 
shift towards a left-wing political orientation took place in the three countries during the 
1990-99 time period and the largest shift took place in Belgium. Belgian Catholics have a 
higher right-wing political orientation than Irish or Slovenian Catholics. In the sample 
year 1999, for example, the mean on the political ideology scale (with values close to 0 
representing a left-wing orientation) was 2.08 for Belgian Catholics and 1.89 for both 
Irish and Slovenian Catholics. By contrast and consistent with theoretical expectations, in 
Slovenia a drift towards the left was less marked than in either Belgium or Ireland.  
From this brief preliminary analysis, it is clear that when one talks about “Belgian 
Catholics”, “Irish Catholics” and “Slovenian Catholics” one is talking about three 
different ways of being Catholic in the universal Catholic Church. In general, Irish 
Catholics tend to be „better‟ Catholics than Belgian or Slovenian Catholics in the sense 
that they are more likely to follow church teaching on important socio-moral issues and 
to „believe‟ and „belong‟ more than either Belgian or Slovenian Catholics. Belgian and 
Slovenian Catholics could be said then to be more secularised than Irish Catholics and 
Slovenian Catholics appear more secularised than Belgian Catholics.  
Taken as a whole, the data point to a higher level of alienation from the 
institutional church among Belgian and Slovenia Catholics than Irish Catholics and a 
stronger Protestantisation – by this is meant a trend towards a greater emphasis on a more 
individualised understanding of Catholic faith and one contrary to official church 
teaching – of Catholicism in these countries than in Ireland. At the same time, it is clear 
that in all three countries there is a decline in frequent participation in the Catholic 
church's major ritual. Notably, across the three societies there is a good deal more 




Determinants of Religious Belief and Practice 
The proceeding preliminary analysis suggested that Irish Catholics tend be “better 
Catholics”  –  or  put  differently  “more  Catholic”  –  than  either  Belgian  or  Slovenian 
Catholics. But what is it about being Catholic in Ireland as compared to Belgium and 
Slovenia that accounts for this?  What individual-level factors help explain higher levels 
of belief and practice among Irish Catholics? To help answer this question I carried out a 
multivariate analysis in which I estimate the influence of a set of explanatory variables on 
two dependent variables – Mass attendance and belief in God. I ran an ordered probit   17 
model for the Mass attendance dependent variable (Tables 12-13) and a binary logistic 
regression for the belief in God dependent variable (tables 14-15) for each country and 
for each wave.. In each model I control for age, income, gender, marital status, number of 
children, and education. I also ran a separate model (results not shown) predicting the 
influence  of  the  control  variables  on  each  of  the  dependent  variables.    Tables  12-15  
report the fully specified models for each country separately, for each dependent variable 
separately, and for each wave separately.   
  The results show that age has positive and strongly statistically significant effects 
on Mass attendance in all three countries. Only in the 1999 wave does this effect 
disappear for the Slovenian sample. Gender is strongly significant in the Irish sample 
only pointing to the fact that women are more likely to attend Mass than men. Number of 
children has a positive and statistically significant effect on Mass attendance in the 
Belgian sample (for the 1990 wave only) and the Slovenian sample (for the 1999 wave 
only). Living together either as a married or cohabiting couple and not being married 
have positive and strongly statistically significant effects on Mass attendance in the 
Belgian sample only (and only in the 1990 wave). Years of education is highly significant 
only in the Belgian sample and only in the 1999 wave.  
  Three findings are particularly noteworthy. First, the co-efficient for social trust in 
large and positive for Belgium and Ireland (for the 1990 wave). The statistically 
significant effect of social trust on Mass attendance in these two countries is in keeping 
with our hypothesis and suggests that people who are more trusting of others are also 
more likely to trust social institutions such as churches than people who are less trusting 
of others. One way of registering one's trust in a religious institution is to attend its major 
rituals. This interesting finding of a linkage between social trust and religious practice 
goes against some previous research. Empirical studies of Scandinavian societies, for 
example, suggest little or no connection between trust and religiosity - Denmark and 
Sweden report high levels of social trust alongside very low levels of religious belief and 
practice (Zuckerman 2008; Delhey & Newton 2005). Second, civic engagement has 
statistically significant effects but its influence varies by country. In Belgium, civic 
engagement has a large and significant positive effect on Mass attendance but in the case 
of Ireland and Slovenia the civic engagement co-efficient has a negative sign. The 
positive effect in Belgium suggests that people who are active in local civic organisations 
also tend to be Mass attenders. They are 'participatory' kinds of people and for them 
going to meetings of voluntary associations and turning up at Mass may well be 
functional equivalents. Mass attendance can thus be considered as an another vehicle 
through which people develop a sense of identification with and belonging to others that 
is a happy consequence of civic activism in general.  
  In the cases of Ireland and Slovenia, civic engagement appears to operate in a 
different way. Civic engagement involves a large commitment of voluntary time and 
effort to attend meetings and meet the other demands that activism entails and this means 
that people who participate in many different kinds of civic activities have less time 
available to do other things such as attend Mass. In this account, owing to time poverty, 
civic engagement substitutes for Mass attendance. 
  The third noteworthy finding about predictors of Mass attendance has to do with 
life satisfaction. Curiously, life satisfaction has a positive and statistically significant on 
Mass attendance in Slovenia (only in the 1999 wave) but not in Belgium or Ireland.   18 
Slovenian Catholics who are happy with their overall life conditions tend to be more 
likely to go to Mass than those who are not. Going to Mass is one way through which 
people can offer their gratitude and appreciation to God for a happy and satisfied life in 
this world. At the same time one might expect that people who are already well satisfied 
with their life circumstances would be unlikely to go to Mass to seek the compensations 
for suffering and distress in this life that it might have to offer but this does not appear to 
be true for Slovenian Catholics. None of the other explanatory variables in the models 
reached statistical significance. 
  Turning to the findings in relation to determinants of belief in God, Tables 14-15 
report the results of the logistic regression analysis. The results show that in Belgium age 
and gender have statistically significant effects on belief in God in both waves and 
income and marital status in the 1999 wave. In Ireland age has a strong and statistically 
significant effect on belief in God (in the 1990 wave only) and in Slovenia income has 
statistically significant effects in the 1990 wave only and gender and years of education 
in the 1999 wave only. Of the explanatory variables, only national pride reaches 
statistical significance in the case of Ireland. This finding is in line with our expectations 
and suggests some association among Irish Catholics between belief in God and their 
sense of pride in national belonging - perhaps owing to a long history of religious 
persecution based on national ethnic categories mentioned earlier - that does not appear 
to exist among Belgian or Slovenian Catholics.  
 
Conclusion 
  This paper examined different pathways of secularisation in three Catholic 
countries and contributes to our sociological understanding of Roman Catholicism in two 
important ways. First, it identifies cross-national variation in Catholic beliefs and 
practices in three different parts of wider Europe. Second, it attempts to explain this 
variation in terms of a number of individual-level determinants and thereby challenge 
secularisation theories positing a universal unfolding - and in a typical pattern - of the 
apparent declining influence of religiosity in shaping individual religious worldviews and 
actions.  
  The first question posed in this paper asked "to what extent do Belgian Catholics 
differ from the Irish and Slovenian Catholics?" A complex picture emerges from this 
study with respect to the similarities and differences between Belgian, Irish and 
Slovenian Catholics. Clearly, there are interesting differences between Catholics in the 
three countries. Taken together, Irish Catholics come closer to being "good Catholics" 
compared to Belgian and Slovenian Catholics if this is measured in terms of adherence to 
church teaching and the requirement to regularly receive the sacraments of the Catholic 
church. At the same time, compared to 1990 Irish Catholics at the end of the 1990s were 
'less' Catholic - during the 1990s there was a noticeable decline in Mass attendance 
among Irish Catholics although patterns in relation to belief were much less variable. And 
as is clear from the earlier analyses, there is no simple or straightforward relationship 
between Mass attendance on the onehand and beliefs on the other in the three countries 
considered here. Quite a number of Catholics in each country fall into the 'believing 
without belonging' category and a small minority could be characterised as 'belonging 
without believing', that is, attend Mass on a regular basis but do not have believe in the   19 
major tenets of the Catholic faith. Why people express their Catholic identities in this 
way is for future research to explore.     
  The second question asked whether this is variation within each country sample 
by social category. Again, a complex story emerges. Across all three countries there are 
clear age, cohort and gender differences with respect to Catholic practice and belief. 
Consider, for example, that older cohorts tend to attend Mass more frequently and to have 
higher levels of belief in God. Older age categories across all three cases tend to attend 
Mass more often than younger age categories. Irish Catholic men are more likely to 
attend Mass than Belgian and Slovenian Catholic men and Irish Catholic women are 
more likely to attend Mass than their Belgian or Slovenian counterparts.  Irish Catholics 
are more likely to have larger families than either Belgian or Slovenian Catholics and this 
suggests higher approval of pro-natalist church teachings by Irish Catholics than Belgian 
or Slovenian Catholics.  
  Our answer to the third question about "what factors help account for variation 
between individuals in these three Catholic countries?" is intriguing but nonetheless must 
be treated with some caution. In this study, different variables have different effects in 
different national settings. Of the five explanatory variables considered here, social trust 
and civic engagement are the most important in terms of accounting for variation in Mass 
attendance in the three countries but as mentioned earlier they operated differently across 
them. Only national pride appears to exert an influence on belief in God and only among 
Irish Catholics. Against expectations we found non statistically significant effects for the 
other predictor variables.  
  These empirical findings carry an interesting theoretical implication. 
Secularisation theory, as mentioned earlier, posits a strong relationship between 
modernisation and secularisation and assumes that this takes a typical pattern in disparate 
national settings. This paper lends support to the 'varieties of Catholicism' position that 
individuals in different Catholic countries with variable histories, polities, and cultures 
will be differently influenced by secularisation forces and influences. It also suggests that 
the sociology of religion literature differentiating between Catholic, Protestant and 
mixed-religion clusters tends to sidestep important variation within at least one of these 
clusters.  
Although this study adds to our understanding of cross-national variation in 
Roman Catholicism, it leaves a number of issues and questions unexplored. It has 
focused on assessing the influence of different individual-level variables on religious 
practice and belief but tells us little about people‟s religious socialisation and how this 
varies from one Catholic country to another. By collecting data about this we would be 
better positioned to get at „why' questions – why do people believe in one thing rather 
than another? Why is there variation in people‟s beliefs across different socio-moral 
issues? Survey investigators tend to assume the „equality of meaning‟ (Moors and 
Wennekers 2003, p. 156) of survey questions across different waves and societies though 
there are good reasons for thinking that it may vary. Asking people about whether they 
self-identify as Catholic or not reduces Roman Catholicism to an identity badge or 
category (Leege and Welch 1989) and veils the fact that Belgian Catholics may well 
interpret the meaning of what it means to be Catholic in everyday situations in ways 
different from Irish or Slovenian Catholics.   20 
Not all possible individual-level explanations of religious belief and practice were 
tested in this study either. Some of the observed differences in Mass attendance between 
the country samples may have to do with variables not included in our models such as 
time availability. In complex modern consumer societies Mass attendance on a Saturday 
evening or Sunday morning competes with a wide range of other activities such as 
shopping, playing sports, socialising with friends and so forth and this may well play an 
important role in individual-level decision-making processes about whether to attend 
Mass or not. Clearly, going to religious services involves opportunity costs and some 
people may well forego it to become involved in other enjoyable secular pursuits. Spatial 
considerations such as physical distance from or proximity to a Catholic church may also 
exert an influence on choices about how to spend one's limited time.  
Moving from the individual-level to the group-level of analysis, survey research 
tends to abstract beliefs and practices from their social context. Qualitative data gathering 
techniques are better suited to getting at such variable interpretations and contextual 
understandings. Consider, for example, that Catholic religious identity is chiefly 
organised, expressed and affirmed through local Catholic parishes (Leege and Welch 
1989) and that Mass attendance takes place in group settings (Hadaway, Marler and 
Chaves, 1993). It is also clear that being Catholic cannot be reduced to going to Mass or 
believing in God and also encompasses visiting pilgrimage sites, attending prayer group 
meetings, participating in service projects helping the poor and needy, and so forth. By 
combining the large-scale social survey data of the present study with qualitative data 
gathered via in-depth interviews and participant observation about such things as local 
Catholic parish life, Catholic material culture, and how this interacts or not with more 
institutional manifestations of Catholicism, we would be better equipped to understand 
the shifting contours of Catholic Europe.  
And clearly how individuals practice and give meaning to their religious identities 
is influenced by the societal context in which they are embedded (Chaves and Hagaman 
2002). The Catholic Church is a transnational religious institution (Hehir 2006) but it 
takes specific forms in particular national contexts. Each of the Catholic cases examined 
here were shaped in important and complex ways by their particular histories, cultures 
and economies and these may well help explain – beyond the factors considered here – 
some of the variation between them. Examining variation within each of these cases also 
has the potential to teach us about how Catholicism is patterned in terms of regional 
differences. Our understanding of the dynamics of secularisation in wider Catholic 
Europe could be further enhanced by the inclusion of a larger pool of big Catholic 
countries including Poland, Hungary, Italy, and Spain. We hope that future researchers of 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2: Variables and Definitions Used in the Analyses                       
Variables        Definition                         
 
Demographic Background  Variables 
  Age        In years 
  Gender       Men = 1 
  Income      In national currencies 
  Marital Status     Living Together = 1, Not married = 2  
  Children      Number of 
  Education      In years 
 
Explanatory Variables 
  Social Trust      "Most people can be trusted"            1 = most people can be trusted, 2 = can't be too careful 
  National Pride     "How proud are you to be (nationality)"      0 = not at all proud, 4 = very proud      
  Efficacy      "How much freedom of choice and control"  Measured on scale: 1 = none at all, 10 = a great deal 
  Life Satisfaction    "How satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?" Measured on a scale: 1 =    
          dissatisfied, 10 = satisfied 
  Civic Engagement    "List of voluntary organizations and activities and say...which, if any, do you belong to?" 1 =  
          belong, 0 = not mentioned   
  Political Ideology    "How would you place your views on this scale" Measured on scale: 1 = left, 10 = right 
 
Dependent Variables 
  Mass Attendance    "Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, how often do you attend religious services  
          these days?" 
          Measured on scale: 1 = never practically never, 8 = more than once a week 
  Belief in God      "Which, if any, of the following (God) do you believe in?" 1 = Yes, 0 = No 
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Table 6: Correlation Coefficients for Variables Used in the Analysis of Mass Attendance (Belgium, 1990)   
Variable      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)     
Dependent Variable  
(1)   Mass Attendance  1.000 
Demographic Variables   
(2)  Age    .255*  1.000 
(3)   Gender (Male=1)  -.0093  -.0606*  1.000 
(4)  Income    .0066  -.1907*  .0293  1.000 
(5)  Living together  .0171  ..0799*  .0512*  .1800*  1.000 
 (6)  Number of Children  .1465*  .4158*  -.0965*  -.0150*  .2842*  1.000 
(7)  Years  of Education  -.0109  -.3183*  .0867*  .2275*  -.0899*  -.1988*  1.000 
Explanatory Variables 
(8)  Social Trust  .1417*  -.0505*  .0147  .0768*  -.0456  -.0382  .1100*  1.000 
(9)   National Pride  .0312  .0684*  -.1019*  -.0538*  -.0033  .0274  -.1495*  -.0035  1.000 
(10)   Efficacy    -.0382  -.0450  .0651*  .0845*  .0052  -.0471*  .0266  .0443  -.0092  1.000 
(11)  Life Satisfaction  .0482*  -.0750*  .0305  .0730*  .0982*  .0106  .0457  .0933*  .0508*  .2437*  1.000 
(12)   Civic  Engagement  -.1432*  .0907*  -.0816*  -.0867*  -.0283  -.0341  -.1372*  -.0868*  .0319  -.0403  -.1107*  1.000 
 (13)   Political Ideology  -.0678*  -.1163*  -.0085  .0498*  -.0119  -.0188  .0619*  .0480*  -.0475  .0484*  .0341  -.0245  1.000 
 
*p <.05 **p <.01 ***p <.001 
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Table 7: Correlation Coefficients for Variables Used in the Analysis of Mass Attendance (Ireland, 1990) 
Variable      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)   
Dependent Variable  
(1)   Mass Attendance  1.000 
Demographic Variables   
(2)  Age    .2054*  1.000 
 (3)  Gender (Male =1)  -.1179*  .0200  1.000 
(4)  Income    -.1085*  -.3528*  -.0027  1.000 
(5)  Living together  .0648*  .1808*  .0024  .0257  1.000 
(6)  Number of Children  .1106*  .4614*  -.0672*  -.1073*  .5654  1.000 
(7)  Years of Education  -.0271  -.4029*  -.0533  .4278*  -.1461*  -.3064*  1.000 
Explanatory Variables 
(8)  Social Trust  .1458*  .0548  -.0144  .1315*  .0314  -.0166  .1116*  1.000 
(9)   National Pride  .0588  -.0903*  .0108  .0441  .0500  -.0228  -.0001  .0102  1.000 
(10)   Efficacy    .0049  -.1193*  .0234  .1227*  .0427  -.0149  .1003*  .0639  .0569  1.000 
(11)   Life Satisfaction  .0349  .0233*  -.0248  .1232*  .1417*  .0444  .0654  .1337*  .0892*  .4115*  1.000 
(12)   Civic  Engagement  -.0048  .1780*  -.1024*  -.3257*  .0420  .0723*  -.2595*  -.1154*  -.0476  -.0830*  -.0580  1.000 
(13)   Political Ideology  -.0192  -.0371  -.0512  -.0153  -.0276  .0066  .0065  .0634  -.0028  -.0544  .0032  .0317  1.000 
*p <.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001    
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Table 8: Correlation Coefficients for Variables Used in the Analysis of Mass Attendance (Slovenia, 1992) 
Variable      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)     
Dependent Variable  
(1)   Mass Attendance  1.000 
Demographic Variables   
(2)  Age    -.0446  1.000 
(3)  Gender    -.0464  -.1154*  1.000 
(4)  Income    -.0785*  -.1854*  .0465  1.000 
(5)  Living together  -.0607  .1755*  .0080  .0259  1.000 
(6)  Number of Children  .0996*  .4531*  -.1113*  -.1510*  .4302*  1.000 
(7)  Years of Education  -.0840*  -.0433  .1147  .1899  .0045  -.1447*  1.000 
Explanatory Variables 
(8)  Social Trust  .0132  -.0434  .1039*  .1196*  -.1138*  .0590  .2134*  1.000 
(9)   National Pride  .0257  .0012  .0231  -.0286  .0490  .0695  -.0189  -.0809*  1.000 
(10)   Efficacy    -.0439  -.1076*  .0557  .1363  -.0654  .1036*  .1252*  .1193*  .0395  1.000 
(11)  Life Satisfaction  .0663  -.0990*  .0377  .2828*  .0650  .0489  .0889*  .0703  .0459  .3642*  1.000 
(12)   Civic  Engagement  -.0276  .2051*  -.1501*  -.1860*  -.0571  .1055*  -.1589*  -.0793*  .0107  -.0789*  -.0566  1.000 
(13)   Political Ideology  -.0202  -.0720  -.0153  .0598  -.0658  .0264  .0199  -.0347  -.0012  -.0436  -.0951*  -.0318  1.000 
*p <.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001    
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Table 9: Correlation Coefficients for Variables Used in the Analysis of Belief in God (Belgium, 1990)   
Variable      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)   
Dependent Variable  
(1)   Belief in  God  1.000 
Demographic Variables   
(2)  Age    .1379*  1.000 
(3)   Gender (Male=1)  -.1064*  -.0606*  1.000 
(4)  Income    .0198  -.1907*  .0293  1.000 
(5)  Living together  .0628*  .0799*  .0512*  .1800*  1.000 
(6)  Number of Children  .0875*  .4158*  -.0965*  -.0150  .2842*  1.000 
(7)  Years  of Education  -.0779*  -.3183*  .0867*  .2275*  -.0899*  -.1988*  1.000 
Explanatory Variables 
(8)  Social Trust  .0142  -.0505*  .0147  .0768*  -.0456  -.0382  .1100*  1.000 
 (9)   National Pride  .0207  .0684*  -.1019*  -.0538*  -.0033  .0274  -.1495*  -.0035  1.000 
(10)   Efficacy    -.0295  -.0450  .0651*   .0845*  .0052  -.0471*  .0266  .0443  -.0092  1.000 
(11)   Life Satisfaction  -.0057  -.0750*  .0305  .0730*  .0982*  .0106  .0457  .0933*  .0508*  .2437*  1.000 
(12)   Civic  Engagement  .0039  .0907*  -.0816*  -.0867*  -.0283  -.0341  -.1372  -.0868*  .0319  -.0402  -.1107*  1.000 
 (13)   Political Ideology  -.0050  -.1163*  -.0085  .0498*  -.0119  -.01888  .0619*  .0480*  -.0475  -.0484*  .0341  -.0245  1.000 
*p <.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
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Table 10: Correlation Coefficients for Variables Used in the Analysis of Belief in God (Ireland, 1990)   
Variable      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)   
Dependent Variable  
(1)   Belief in  God  1.000 
Demographic Variables   
(2)  Age    .0761*  1.000 
(3)   Gender (Male=1)  -.0528  .0200  1.000 
(4)  Income    .0313  -.3528*  -.0027  1.000 
(5)  Living together  .0479  .1808  .0024  .0257  1.000 
(6)  Number of Children  .0498  .4614*  -.0672*  -.1073*  .5654*  1.000 
(7)  Years  of Education  -.0085  -.4029*  -.0533  .4278*  -.1461*  -.3064  1.000 
Explanatory Variables 
(8)  Social Trust  .0650  .0548  .0144  .1315*  .0314  -.0106  .1116*  1.000 
(9)   National Pride  .0879*  -.0903*  .0108  .0441  .0500  -.0228  -.0001  .0102  1.000 
(10)   Efficacy    .0211  -.1198*  .0234  .1227*  .0427  -.0149  .1003*  .0639  .0569  1.000 
(11)  Life Satisfaction  .0442  .0233  -.0248  .1232*  .1417*  .0444  .0654*  .1337*  .0892*  .4115*  1.000 
(12)   Civic  Engagement  -.0190  .1788*  -.1024*  -.3257*  .0420  .0723*  -.2595*  -.1154*  -.0476  -.0830*  -.0580  1.000 
 (13)   Political  Ideology  .0547  -.0371  -.0512  -.0153  -.0276  .0066  .0065  -.0634  -.0028  .0544  .0032  .0317  1.000 
*p <.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
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Table 11: Correlation Coefficients for Variables Used in the Analysis of Belief in God (Slovenia, 1992)   
Variable      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)     
Dependent Variable  
(1)   Belief in  God  1.000 
Demographic Variables   
(2)  Age    .0657  1.000 
(3)   Gender (Male=1)  -.1009*  -.1154*  1.000 
(4)  Income     -.1656*  -.1854  .0465  1.000 
(5)  Living together  .0041  .1755*  .0080  .0259  1.000 
(6)  Number of Children  .1094*  .4531*  -.1113*  -.1510*  .4302*  1.000 
(7)  Years  of  Education  -.1933*  -.0433  .1147*  .1899  .0045  -.1447*  1.000 
Explanatory Variables       
(8)  Social Trust  -.0281  -.0434  .1039*  .1196*  -.1138*  -.0590  .2134*  1.000 
(9)   National Pride  -.0000  .0012  .0231  -.0286  .0490  .0695  -.0189  -.809*  1.000 
(10)   Efficacy    -.0499  -.0176*  .0557  .1363*  -.0654  -.1036*  .1252*  .1193*  .0395  1.000 
(11)  Life Satisfaction  -.0296  -.0990*  .0377  .2828*  .0650  .0489  .0889*  .0703  .0459  .3642*  1.000 
(12)   Civic  Engagement  .0484  .2051*  -.1501*  -.1860*  -.0571  .1055*  -.1589*  -.0793*  .0107  -.0789*  -.0566  1.000 
 (13)   Political Ideology  -.0014  -.0720  -.0153  -.0598  -.0658  -.0264  .0199  -.0347  -.0012  -.0436  -.0951*  -.0318  1.000 
*p <.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
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Table 12: Ordered Logit Regression Analysis of Individual-Level Determinants of Mass Attendance (Belgium, Ireland and Slovenia 
separately, 1990 (1992) wave) 
                       
Variable      Belgium    Ireland     Slovenia  
Age        .01***      .02***      -.01*** 
        (.002)      (.002)      (.00) 
Gender (Male=1)    -.18**      -.43***     -.02 
        (.05)      (.07)      (.09) 
Income       1.94      -.000**     -1.52  
        (1.34)      (6.53)      (6.78) 
Living Together      -.10      -.03      -.31** 
        (.06)      (.09)      (.11) 
Number of Children    .03      -.00      .22*** 
        (.02)      (.02)      (.04) 
Years of Education    .01      .03*      -.01 
        (.008)      (.01)      (.08) 
Social Trust      .34***      .35***      .09 
        (.05)      (.07)      (.13) 
National Pride      -.01      .70*       -.07  
        (.08)      (.30)      (.17) 
Efficacy      -.02      .02      -.04 
        (.01)      (.02)      (.02) 
Life Satisfaction    -.03      -.00      .07** 
        (.01)      (.02)      (.02) 
Civic Engagement    .33***      -.17*      -.19** 
        (.05)      (.08)      (.09) 
Political Ideology    -.03      -.03      -.04 
        (.02)      (.03)      (.04) 
N        1423      903      555 
R
2        .03      .07      .02 
                          29 
Note: Table figures are regression co-efficients with standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories are female for gender and not 
married for marital status. The dependent variable is the frequency of Mass attendance among individuals in each country. * p < .05; 
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Table 13: Ordered Logit Regression Analysis of Individual-Level Determinants of Mass Attendance (Belgium, Ireland and Slovenia 
separately, 1999 wave) 
                       
Variable      Belgium    Ireland     Slovenia  
Age        .01***      .03***      .004 
        (.002)      (.00)      (.003)       
Gender (Male=1)    -.10      -.39***     -.16 
        (.07)      (.08)      (.08) 
Income       -7.12      -2.71      1.46** 
        (1.88)      (4.99)      (4.74) 
Living Together      .05      .15      -.007 
        (.09)      (.09)      (.10) 
Number of Children    .01      .01      .17*** 
        (.02)      (.02)      (.04) 
Years of Education    .03**      .03*      -.01 
        (.01)      (.01)      (.01) 
Social Trust      .20*      .14      -.14 
        (.08)      (.08)      (.10) 
National Pride      .18*      .87*      .06 
        (.09)      (.39)      (.16) 
Efficacy      -.00      -.01      -.01 
        (.02)      (.02)      (.02) 
Life Satisfaction    .02      .04      .06** 
        (.02)      (.02)      (.02) 
Civic Engagement    .47***      -.29***     -.28** 
        (.08)      (.08)      (.08) 
Political Ideology    -.01      -.00      -.09 
        (.03)      (.04)      (.04) 
N        805      771      610 
R
2        .03      .1      .02 
                           31 
Note: Table figures are regression co-efficients with standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories are female for gender and not married for 
marital status. The dependent variable is the frequency of Mass attendance among individuals in each country.  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; 
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Table 14: Logistic Regression Analysis of Individual-Level Determinants of Belief in God (Belgium, Ireland and Slovenia separately, 1990 
(1992) wave) 
                       
Variable      Belgium    Ireland     Slovenia  
Age        .03***      .09**      -.003 
        (.00)      (.04)      (.009) 
Gender        -.68**      -1.7      -.31 
        (.23)      (.92)      (.24) 
Income       5.56      .00       -.5.76** 
        (5.68)      (.00)      (1.86) 
Marital Status      .07       .46      -.10 
        (.27)      (1.2)      (.32) 
Number of Children    .15      -.18      .26 
        (.10)      (.35)      (.13) 
Years of Education    -.03      -.05      .06** 
        (.03)      (.19)      (.01) 
Social Trust      .40      1.56      .45   
        (.25)      (1.12)      (.37) 
National Pride      .09      2.92*      -.15 
        (.31)      (1.36)      (.51) 
Efficacy      -.06      .09      -.02 
        (.05)      (.20)      (.06) 
Life Satisfaction    .05      .04      .04 
        (.06)      (.18)      (.06) 
Civic Engagement    .03      -.62      -.20 
        (.24)      (.81)      (.26) 
Political Ideology    -.04      .92      -.01 
        (.10)      (.50)      (.13) 
N        1323      893      484 
R
2        .08      .26      .08 
                           33 
Note: Table figures are regression co-efficients with standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories are female for gender and not married for 
marital status. The dependent variable is whether individual in each country believes in God or not. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; Source: 
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Table 15: Logistic Regression Analysis of Individual-Level Determinants of Belief in God (Belgium, Ireland and Slovenia separately, 1999 
wave) 
                       
Variable      Belgium    Ireland     Slovenia  
Age        .03**      .01      -.002 
        (.01)      (.02)      (.009) 
Gender        -.58*      -1.01      -.57* 
        (.27)      (.75)      (.24)                 
Income       -1.43*      -.00      -2.20 
        (6.52)      (.00)      (1.24)                 
Marital Status      .63      1.72      .17 
        (.32)      (1.06)      (.30)                 
Number of Children    .01      .14      .06 
        (.10)      (.30)      (.14) 
Years of Education    .04      -.09      -.06** 
        (.04)      (.09)      (.20) 
Social Trust      -.32      -.66      .002 
        (.29)      (.69)      (.29) 
National Pride      -.16      2.29      .21 
        (.34)      (1.31)      (.43) 
Efficacy      .008      .13      -.17 
        (.07)      (.17)      (.07) 
Life Satisfaction    -.06      .18      .11 
        (.08)      (.16)      (.06) 
Civic Engagement    -.27      -.45      -.34 
        (.29)      (.71)      (.24) 
Political Ideology    .11      .04      .06 
        (.12)      (.38)      (.11) 
N        766      762      588 
R
2        .06      .20      .06 
                           35 
Note: Table figures are regression co-efficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is whether individual in each country 
believes in God or not. Reference categories are not married for marital status and female for gender.  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; Source: 





























































Graphs by Cohort, 1990 wave






































































































BE IE SI BE IE SI BE IE SI
BE IE SI BE IE SI
<18 18-35 years old 36-50 years old
























Graphs by Age Categories, 1990(92)/1999 wave












































Graphs by Cohort, 1990 wave












































Graphs by Cohort, 1990 wave












































Graphs by Cohort, 1992 wave
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